








A paper delivered at the 2009 meeting of the International Society for Humor Research.


The title of this paper has probably raised a few eyebrows. Jokes seem a long way from transcendence. Funny, yes; amusing and sometimes pleasant, yes, but transcendent??  Move on to practical jokes and the skepticism gets even stronger—the eyebrows leave the forehead altogether.  What does a fart cushion have to do with transcendence?  	
I take my cue from Peter Berger, the coauthor of the theory of social construction. In his book Redeeming Laughter, he argues that the way we customarily organize reality—the way we construct it for ourselves—is just that; a mere construction.  Berger calls the web of categories, rules, and patterns by which we organize our perceptions and look at the world “the social order.” “Social order, when it functions well, envelops the individual in a web of habits and meanings that are experienced as self-evidently real,” explains Peter Berger. “Despite this semblance of solidity, social order is always is always vulnerable to disruptions. These disruptions are caused, among other things, by the intrusions of other realities. The sacred is one such interruption. The comic is another" (1997: 65). 

Consider an Ontario farmhouse.  There is a place for everything and everything in its place—bedrooms are for sleeping; humans are inside the house, animals are outside.  The floors are swept; the kitchen pantry is in order with cans and jars of food neatly labeled as to their contents. 
Now consider the same house after a shivaree, a traditional custom in which neighbors get together to play practical jokes on anyone who has been recently married.  I quote folklorist Pauline Greenhill: 

Beds are disassembled, short sheeted, or filled with cereal.  The bedroom itself is violated by the intrusion of shivareers, domestic animals, or even an old girlfriend of the new husband. ...  Houses are garlanded with toilet paper and toilets filled with seltzer or covered with Saran Wrap. . . .Bureau drawers are dumped out; labels are removed from cans of food; straw is strewn around the house, and linens are soaked in jello. (Greenhill 1989:52)

What we have here is disorder made concrete.  Inside and outside are mixed up.  Dirt is introduced deliberately (and as Mary Douglas told us years ago, dirt is simply anything that is out of place (Douglas 19 )). Another word for this, of course, is chaos. According to William Fry, in humor, "we create chaos and play with it (230). . . . we are creating, manipulating and controlling chaos"(Fry1992 230f). " Properly bounded that is, chaos can be fun. 
Berger argues that the experience of the comic is the perception that “man is in a state of comic discrepancy with respect to the order of the universe.”  Michael Mulkay makes a similar observation: "The serious mode is not a neutral medium for making sense of the world,” he avers. “ It involves positive assumptions about the world, the most fundamental of which is that there is one, real, unitary world that can be described without paradox and inconsistency. . . .  The danger is ... that we have come to mistake what are only the tacit assumptions of our discursive practice for real features of an independent world" (1988 220).
The comic—in its typical two-faced way—hints at the existence of alternative realities but at the same time asserts that they are just fantasy. Humor does not exactly embrace this incongruity; the presence of the joking frame affirms the primacy of the serious mode and the paramount reality. With verbal jokes, we can sit back and enjoy representations of the universe that lurks outside the social order, safe in the knowledge that it is “just a joke.” Practical jokes go further by making their targets experience chaos directly and personally—while others watch. While humor and other finite provinces of meaning are usually carefully restricted and bounded, the practical joke is humor unbound.  Without warning, it throws its targets outside the social order.  This experience can be unsettling; and sometimes, the epistemological unease it causes extends to the jokers as well.  I will illustrate this claim with reference to the April Fools’ Day jokes perpetrated annually by journalists.
April Fools’ Day is the most widespread occasion for playing with chaos in the western world today. A glance at any of the familiar mass media brings a picture of a world turned upside down. On the same day, one newspaper announces that scientists have discovered an amazing link between printer’s ink and weight loss, urging readers to soak their paper in water and wrap themselves in it to see for themselves. A finance company releases a sausage-scented scratch and sniff credit card. Finally, European Union bureaucrats ban April Fools’ Day because of the physical and mental injury suffered by the victims of all these jokes.​[1]​  
Like all practical jokes, April Fools’ Day spoofs are risky. Even successful hoaxes elicit outrage, reader complaints, and cancelled subscriptions. ​[2]​ Media hoaxers themselves are aware that they are flouting professional ethics.  So, why do they risk it?  I argue that April Fools’ hoaxes provide an occasion for journalists to play and to show off their professional skills.  More importantly, this play also touches on deep epistemological issues at the heart of their work. 
Consider the story broadcast by New Hampshire Public Radio last year. The story began innocently enough with the claim that the New Hampshire Forest Society, a venerable local conservation organization, had succeeded in growing a stand of perfectly square trees at a secret location. The reporter explored the economic advantages of harvesting square trees—more trees could be grown per acre, transport and processing costs would be lower, and so on.  However, square trees might have a negative effect on wildlife. “It could be difficult for bears to climb trees.” “We’re all tree huggers at heart,” admitted the spokesman for the Forest Society.  “It just won’t be the same hugging a square tree.” The story closed with the sober statement, “The square trees will be ready to harvest on April first of next year.”
The story ran during the April First news broadcast. Thereafter, a transcript and recording were added to the NHPR website, complete with a link to the “official” press release on the Forest Society’s website. 
Jack and Amy, the creators of the square trees hoax, told me that it was very successful. They received calls and emails from people who either congratulated them on the story or wanted to check on their suspicion that it was not a bona fide report after all. In terms of generating publicity and traffic to their website, the spoof was a complete success. 
But, there was an undercurrent of ambivalence about all this exposure. “I’m pitching stories all the time and I’m trying to get media to cover out land protection activity,” said Jack: 
I pitch a story about protecting a thousand acres, that includes water supply for tens of thousands of people, and wildlife habitat and working forests … and I get ten seconds. I pitch a story about square trees, I get four minutes. 
Amy was similarly ambivalent about all the attention. “It’s so funny,” she told me: 
I have never gotten more response, on any story I’ve ever done, than this one. [Laughs] Which is sort of sad, when you think about it. [Laughs] I mean, I consider myself as a good reporter; why aren’t they talking about the good stories? [Laughs.]  Instead of the joke stories. 
These comments express some frustration with the media audience.  While they welcomed the attention, these journalists lamented that their real news, news that had significance in the real world, did not get the same attention. They saw their jobs as the discovery and promulgation of facts, but their listeners preferred jokes. 
This ambivalence about the success of the spoof story reflects a built-in incongruity in the journalist’s role, because their job is not only to deliver the facts, but also to win audiences, as Noam Chomsky famously observed.​[3]​  In the aftermath of their hugely successful spoof, Jack and Amy discovered that these two goals are at odds. Amy happened to mention that her usual work was what she called “hardcore news,” not “fluffy featury stuff,” but newscasts and newspapers are actually full of fluffy featury stuff. The media bring us not only news and information, but also entertainment and advertising. Hardcore reporters may decry the public’s insatiable demand for infotainment, but editors and publishers recognize that they need it to win and keep audiences.​[4]​ News stories, press releases, and news broadcasts do not write themselves. Even in hardcore reporting, unadorned facts win few readers.  
Compelling stories require craft, and April Fools’ Day spoofs put this craft on display. When journalists play on April First, they uncover the constructions—literally, the “fictions” that lie behind the news. Freed from the requirements of research and fact checking, they can highlight their other professional skills of recording, writing, editing, and presenting data; skills that they use every day to attract interest and create credibility.​[5]​ The everyday documentary or factual mode requires these skills to be muted, even hidden, but April Fools’ Day confers a temporary license to strut them openly. 
Yet there is more going on in the tradition of media hoaxes than simply showing off professional skills. The unease goes deeper: for if news is constructed rather than simply reported, what does that say about its truth-value? In a 1996 article, James Cooper asks whether the news itself is not “a deception, a sustained and commonly held hoax.”​[6]​ Given the limitations of human perception, he describes news making as a process in which “delimiting, inaccurate, and relative reductions of reality somehow become miraculously converted to ‘reliable sources,’ ‘official spokespersons,’ and ‘eye witness accounts’ in the fictional construction of news” (77). 
Cooper’s analysis expresses a deep-seated unease with the ontological status of news as factual discourse. What he recognized—and what media spoofs enact—is that the news is not merely reported, but constructed. The epistemological ramifications of this observation are far reaching, because most of us rely on the media to inform us about the state of the wider world.  In other words the news forms part of Peter Berger’s social order, or the social construction of reality.​[7]​ 
A successful media hoax needs both dupes and skeptics among its audiences—the former to testify to the media’s power, the latter to serve as an assurance that the exercise is, after all, just a joke. If some are fooled, the perpetrators can claim credit for not only good writing and creativity, but also extremely effective news making—all thrown into relief and magnified by contrast with the uncritical and gullible approach of the public. 
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^1	  All of these stories appeared in the mass media on April First, 2005 in: The Otago Daily Times; Manhattan College Quadrangle; Virgin Group’s Australian Finance Division; NPR news program All Things Considered; Wikipedia.com; Nature.com; and The Sun. 
^2	  Fedler 1989:201-203.  See also Wainwright 2007.
^3	  “The purpose of the media is to sell audiences to advertisers” (Herman and Chomsky 1988). 
^4	   (Roscoe and Hight 2001).  See also Oring 
^5	  "Art and factuality are often at odds." (Oring 2008).
^6	  Cooper 1996.
^7	  (Berger and Luckmann 1967). 
^8	  Wainwright 2007:152-160; (10 Stories That Could Be Pranks--but Aren't); (10 Stories That Could Be April Fools... But Aren't ). 
^9	  Wainwright 2007:ix-x. 
